Tempo:
CHAP. IX
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH
279
delegates of the army; for, until that were done, no 1845-6. progress could be said to have been made in the war, and every petty chief in Hindustan would have silently prepared for asserting his independence, or for enlarging his territory on the first opportunity. But the total dispersion of so large and So well equipped a body of brave men, as that which lay within sight of the available force of the British Government, could not be accomplished by one defeat, if the chiefs of the country were to be rendered desperate, and if all were to place their valour and unanimity under the direction of one able man. The English, therefore, intimated to Gulab Singh their readiness to acknowledge a Sikh sovereignty in Lahore after the army should have been disbanded; but the Raja declared his inability to deal with the troops, which still overawed him and other well-wishers to the family of Ran jit Singh. This helplessness was partly exaggerated for selfish objects; but time pressed; the speedy dictation of a treaty under the walls of Lahore was essential to the British reputation; and the views of either party were in some An undersort met by an understanding that the Sikh army standing should be attacked by the English, and that when «=°™^ *°' beaten it should be openly abandoned by its own gov- g^^^^ ernment; and further, that the passage of the Sutlej ghau t>e should be unopposed and the road to the capital laid attacked by open to the victors. Under such circumstances of dis- the one and creet policy and shameless treason was the battle of deserted by
^^ °*^^^Sobraon fought.^ The Sikhs had gradually brought the greater part The j)f their force into the entrenchment on the left bank defensive of the Sutlej, which had been enlarged as impulse ^*su*s* prompted or as opportunity seemed to offer. They placed sixty-seven pieces of artillerj^ in battery, and their strength was estimated at thirty-five thousand fighting men; but it is probable that twenty thousand would exceed the truth; and of that reduced number, it
is certain that all
were not regular troops.
The en-
trenchment likewise showed a fatal want of unity of command and of design; ^and at Sobraon, as in the other battles of the campaign, the soldiers did everyCf. the Governor-General's letter to the Secret Com1
mittee, of the 19th Feb. 1846; from which, however, those only who were mixed up with the negotiations can extract aught indicative of the understandng with Gulab Singh which is alluded to in the text. It was for this note chiefly, if not entirely, that the author was removed from political employment by the East India Company. This was the author's own conviction, from careful inquiries made in India; and has been the result of equally careful inquiries made by men in England.
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH
279
delegates of the army; for, until that were done, no 1845-6. progress could be said to have been made in the war, and every petty chief in Hindustan would have silently prepared for asserting his independence, or for enlarging his territory on the first opportunity. But the total dispersion of so large and So well equipped a body of brave men, as that which lay within sight of the available force of the British Government, could not be accomplished by one defeat, if the chiefs of the country were to be rendered desperate, and if all were to place their valour and unanimity under the direction of one able man. The English, therefore, intimated to Gulab Singh their readiness to acknowledge a Sikh sovereignty in Lahore after the army should have been disbanded; but the Raja declared his inability to deal with the troops, which still overawed him and other well-wishers to the family of Ran jit Singh. This helplessness was partly exaggerated for selfish objects; but time pressed; the speedy dictation of a treaty under the walls of Lahore was essential to the British reputation; and the views of either party were in some An undersort met by an understanding that the Sikh army standing should be attacked by the English, and that when «=°™^ *°' beaten it should be openly abandoned by its own gov- g^^^^ ernment; and further, that the passage of the Sutlej ghau t>e should be unopposed and the road to the capital laid attacked by open to the victors. Under such circumstances of dis- the one and creet policy and shameless treason was the battle of deserted by
^^ °*^^^Sobraon fought.^ The Sikhs had gradually brought the greater part The j)f their force into the entrenchment on the left bank defensive of the Sutlej, which had been enlarged as impulse ^*su*s* prompted or as opportunity seemed to offer. They placed sixty-seven pieces of artillerj^ in battery, and their strength was estimated at thirty-five thousand fighting men; but it is probable that twenty thousand would exceed the truth; and of that reduced number, it
is certain that all
were not regular troops.
The en-
trenchment likewise showed a fatal want of unity of command and of design; ^and at Sobraon, as in the other battles of the campaign, the soldiers did everyCf. the Governor-General's letter to the Secret Com1
mittee, of the 19th Feb. 1846; from which, however, those only who were mixed up with the negotiations can extract aught indicative of the understandng with Gulab Singh which is alluded to in the text. It was for this note chiefly, if not entirely, that the author was removed from political employment by the East India Company. This was the author's own conviction, from careful inquiries made in India; and has been the result of equally careful inquiries made by men in England.
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