Tempo:
HISTORY OF THE SIKHS
278 1845-6.
The Sikh chiefs
anxious to treat,
and
the English desirous bi ending the
war.
CHAP. IX
The victory was equally important and opportune, and the time-serving Gulab Singh, whose skill and capacity might have protracted the war, first reproached the vanquished Sikhs for rashly engaging in hostilities with their colossal neighbour, and then entered into negotiations with the English leaders.^ The Governor-General was not displeased that the Lahore authorities should be ready to yield; for he truly felt that to subjugate the Punjab in one season, to defeat an army as numerous as his own, to take two capitals, and to lay siege to Multan, arid Jammu, and Peshawar all within a few months was a task of The difficult achievement and full of imminent risks. dominion of the English in India hinges mainly upon the number and efficiency of the troops of their own race which they can bring into the field; and a campaign in the hot weather would have thinned the ranks of the European regiments under the most favourable circumstances, and the ordinary recurrence of an epidemic disease would have proved as fatal to
—
—
the officers of every corps present as to the common But besides this important consideration, it soldiers. was felt that the minds of men throughout India were agitated, and that protracted hostilities would not only jeopardize the communications with the Jumna, but might disturb the whole of the north-western provinces, swarming with a military population which is ready to follow any standard affording pay or allowing plunder, and which already sighs for the end of a dull reign of peace. Bright visions of standing triumphant on the Indus and of numbering the remotest conquests of Alexander among the provinces of Britain, doubtless warmed the imagination of the Governor-General; but the first object was to drive the Sikhs across the Sutlej by force of arms, or to have them withdrawn to their own side of the river by the unconditional submission of the chiefs- and the prepare themselves as they wished, they as simple soldiers, who had no financial difficulties to consider, would have been amply prepared with all that an army of invasion or defence could have required, long before the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej. Lord Hardinge was chiefly responsible for the timely and adequate equipment of the army, in anticipation of a probable war; and with the Governor-General in the field, p>ossessed of superior and anomalous powers, the Commander-in-Chief could only be held responsible and that but to a limited extent for the strategy of a campaign or the conduct of a
—
—
battle.
Cf. the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, of the 19th Feb. 1846. 1
278 1845-6.
The Sikh chiefs
anxious to treat,
and
the English desirous bi ending the
war.
CHAP. IX
The victory was equally important and opportune, and the time-serving Gulab Singh, whose skill and capacity might have protracted the war, first reproached the vanquished Sikhs for rashly engaging in hostilities with their colossal neighbour, and then entered into negotiations with the English leaders.^ The Governor-General was not displeased that the Lahore authorities should be ready to yield; for he truly felt that to subjugate the Punjab in one season, to defeat an army as numerous as his own, to take two capitals, and to lay siege to Multan, arid Jammu, and Peshawar all within a few months was a task of The difficult achievement and full of imminent risks. dominion of the English in India hinges mainly upon the number and efficiency of the troops of their own race which they can bring into the field; and a campaign in the hot weather would have thinned the ranks of the European regiments under the most favourable circumstances, and the ordinary recurrence of an epidemic disease would have proved as fatal to
—
—
the officers of every corps present as to the common But besides this important consideration, it soldiers. was felt that the minds of men throughout India were agitated, and that protracted hostilities would not only jeopardize the communications with the Jumna, but might disturb the whole of the north-western provinces, swarming with a military population which is ready to follow any standard affording pay or allowing plunder, and which already sighs for the end of a dull reign of peace. Bright visions of standing triumphant on the Indus and of numbering the remotest conquests of Alexander among the provinces of Britain, doubtless warmed the imagination of the Governor-General; but the first object was to drive the Sikhs across the Sutlej by force of arms, or to have them withdrawn to their own side of the river by the unconditional submission of the chiefs- and the prepare themselves as they wished, they as simple soldiers, who had no financial difficulties to consider, would have been amply prepared with all that an army of invasion or defence could have required, long before the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej. Lord Hardinge was chiefly responsible for the timely and adequate equipment of the army, in anticipation of a probable war; and with the Governor-General in the field, p>ossessed of superior and anomalous powers, the Commander-in-Chief could only be held responsible and that but to a limited extent for the strategy of a campaign or the conduct of a
—
—
battle.
Cf. the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, of the 19th Feb. 1846. 1
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