— CHAP. IX WAR WITH THE ENGLISH 277 recollections of their country, by military emulation, i845-e. and by personal feelings of revenge; but at the critical moment, the unaccustomed discipline of many of Gobind's champions failed them. They rose, yet they reserved their fire, and delivered it together at the distance of a spear's throw; nor was it until the mass had been three times ridden through that the Sikhs dispersed. The charge was timely and bold; but the ground was more thickly strewn with the bodies of victorious horsemen than of beaten infantry. An attempt was made to rally behind Bundri; but all resistance was unavailing, the Sikhs were driven across the Sutlej, more than fifty pieces^ of cannon were taken, and the General forgot his sorrows, and the soldiers their sufferings and indignities, in the fullness of their common triumph over a worthy enemy, in a well• planned and bravely fought battle.^ Sixty-seven is the official number given. Ed.] Harry Smith's dispatch of the 30th January, and Lord Gough's dispatch of the 1st February 1846. (Parliamentary Papers, 1846.) The loss sustained was 151 killed, 413 [1 - Cf. Sir wounded, and 25 missing. The Calcutta Review, No. XVI, p. 499, states that Sir Harry Smith required some pressing before he would engage the Sikhs, after his reverse at Badowal. That active leader, however, was in no need of such promptings, and had adequate reinforcements reached him sooner than they did, the battle of Aliwal would have been sooner fought. It may likewise be here mentioned, that neither does the reviewer throughout his article do fair justice to Lord Gough, nor, in a particulaiinstance, to the commissariat department of the army. Thus, with regard to the Commander-in-Chief, it is more than hinted — (see p. 497), that Lord Hardinge was in no way to blame that that Lord Gough was to blame for the delay which occurred in attacking the Sikhs at P'heerooshuhur. It may be difficult to ascertain the causes, or to apportion the blame, but the Governor- General can proudly stand on his acknowledged merits and services, and wants no support at the expense of an ancient comrade-in-arms. Again, with regard to the commissariat, it is stated, at p. 488, that supplies, which the head of the department in the field asked six weeks to furnish, were procured by Major Broadfoot in six days. 'The commissariat is, — department could only use money and effect purchases by contract, or in the open market; but Major Broadfoot could summarily require 'protected chiefs', on pain of confiscation, to meet all his demands; and th4 writer of the article might have learnt, or must have been aware, that the requisitions in question led to one chief being disgraced by the imposition of a fine, and had some share in the subsequent deposal of another. Had the British magistrates of Delhi, Saharanpur, Bareilly, and other places, been similarly empowered to seize by force the grain and carriage within their limits, there would have been no occasion to disparage the commissariat department. Further, it is known to many, and it is in itself plain, that had tlie miUtary authorities been Required, or allowed, to