Tempo:
CHAP. IX
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH
271
ceeded from the neighbourhood of Karnal, and joined 1845-6. the division of the Sikh army under Ranjor Singh, which had crossed the JuUundur Doab, to the neighbourhood of Ludhiana. This important town had been
denuded of its troops to swell the first army of defence, and it was but slowly and partially garrisoned by fresh regiments arriving from the eastward, although it covered the several lines of approach from the Jumna Early in January the Raja of towards Ferozepore.^ Ladwa returned to withdraw his family from his fief of Eadowal near Ludhiana, and he took the opportunity of burning a portion of the cantonment at the latter place, which the paucity of infantry and the want of cavalry on the spot enabled him to do with impunity. About the same time, the main army of the Sikhs, observing the supineness of their opponents, began to recross the Sutlej and to construct a bridge-head to secure the freedom of their passage. The English were unwillingly induced to let the Sikhs labour at this work, for it was feared that an attack would bring on a general engagement, and that the want of ammunition would prevent a battle being won or a victory being completed. The Sikhs naturally exulted, and they proclaimed that they would again fall upon the Nor were their boasts altogether hated foreigners. disbelieved; the disadvantages of Ferozepore as a frontier post became more and more apparent, and the English began to experience difficulty in obtaining partly in approbation of his liberality in providing the means of throwing a bridge across the classical Sarsuti, at Thanesar. He was a reckless, dissipated man, of moderate capacity; but he inherited the unsettled disposition of his father, Gurdut Singh, who once held Karnal and some villages to the east of the Jumna, and who caused the English some trouble between 1803 and 1809. It is not clear why Ludhiana was not adequately garrisoned, or rather covered, by the troops which marched from Meerut after the battle of P'heerooshuhur. The GovernorGeneral's attention was, indeed, chiefly given to strengthening the main army in its unsupported position of Ferozepore the real military disadvantage of which he had ample reason to deplore; while amidst his difficulties it may possibly have occurred to his Lordship, that the original policy of 1809 of being strong on the Jumna rather than on the Sutlej was a truly wise one with reference to the avoidance of a war with the Sikhs. The desire of being in force near the capitals of the Punjab and the main army of the Sikhs likewise induced Lord Hardinge to direct Sir Charles Napier to march from Sind, without heeding Multan, although, as his Lordship publicly acknowledged, that victorious commander had been sent for when it was thought the campaign might become a series of sieges. '
—
— —
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH
271
ceeded from the neighbourhood of Karnal, and joined 1845-6. the division of the Sikh army under Ranjor Singh, which had crossed the JuUundur Doab, to the neighbourhood of Ludhiana. This important town had been
denuded of its troops to swell the first army of defence, and it was but slowly and partially garrisoned by fresh regiments arriving from the eastward, although it covered the several lines of approach from the Jumna Early in January the Raja of towards Ferozepore.^ Ladwa returned to withdraw his family from his fief of Eadowal near Ludhiana, and he took the opportunity of burning a portion of the cantonment at the latter place, which the paucity of infantry and the want of cavalry on the spot enabled him to do with impunity. About the same time, the main army of the Sikhs, observing the supineness of their opponents, began to recross the Sutlej and to construct a bridge-head to secure the freedom of their passage. The English were unwillingly induced to let the Sikhs labour at this work, for it was feared that an attack would bring on a general engagement, and that the want of ammunition would prevent a battle being won or a victory being completed. The Sikhs naturally exulted, and they proclaimed that they would again fall upon the Nor were their boasts altogether hated foreigners. disbelieved; the disadvantages of Ferozepore as a frontier post became more and more apparent, and the English began to experience difficulty in obtaining partly in approbation of his liberality in providing the means of throwing a bridge across the classical Sarsuti, at Thanesar. He was a reckless, dissipated man, of moderate capacity; but he inherited the unsettled disposition of his father, Gurdut Singh, who once held Karnal and some villages to the east of the Jumna, and who caused the English some trouble between 1803 and 1809. It is not clear why Ludhiana was not adequately garrisoned, or rather covered, by the troops which marched from Meerut after the battle of P'heerooshuhur. The GovernorGeneral's attention was, indeed, chiefly given to strengthening the main army in its unsupported position of Ferozepore the real military disadvantage of which he had ample reason to deplore; while amidst his difficulties it may possibly have occurred to his Lordship, that the original policy of 1809 of being strong on the Jumna rather than on the Sutlej was a truly wise one with reference to the avoidance of a war with the Sikhs. The desire of being in force near the capitals of the Punjab and the main army of the Sikhs likewise induced Lord Hardinge to direct Sir Charles Napier to march from Sind, without heeding Multan, although, as his Lordship publicly acknowledged, that victorious commander had been sent for when it was thought the campaign might become a series of sieges. '
—
— —
©
2026
Lehal.net