CHAP. IX WAR WITH THE ENGLISH 269 the Sikhs were allowed to cross the Sutlej at their 1845-6. leisure to prepare for fresh contests. The sepoy mercenaries had for the first time met an equal antagonist with their own weapons even ranks and the fire of artillery. They loudly complained of the inferiority of their cannon; they magnified banks two and three feet high into formidable ramparts, and exploding tumbrils and stores of powder became, in their imaginations, designed and deadly mines. Nor was this feeling of respect and exaggeration confined to the Indians alone; the European soldiers partook of it; and the British public, as well as the dignitaries of the church and the heads of the state, became impressed with the immensity of the danger which had threatened the peace, and Regiperhaps the safety, of their exotic dominion. ments of men, and numerous single officers variously employed, were summoned from the most distant provinces to aid in vindicating the military renown of — ^ No one, however, can be insensible to the claims which the veteran chief of the army has established to his country's gratitude, by his cheering hardihood under every circumstance of danger, and by his great successes over all opponents. The robust character of Lord Gough has on many occasions stood England in good stead. ^ The alarm of the English about the occupation of Delhi and the passage of the Jumna, may be likened to the nervous dread of Augustus, when he heard of the defeat of Varus and the destruction of his legions; and that one so astute, and so familiar with the sources of Roman power and the causes of Roman weakness, should have feared the consequences of a German invasion of Italy, at once palliates the apprehensions of the English in India and shows upon what slight foundations and undreamt-of chances the mightiest fabrics of dominion sometimes rest. Yet it is not clear that Augustus was not alarmed rather for himself than for Rome. He may have thought that a successful inroad of barbarians would encourage domestic enemies, and so lead to his own downfall, without sensibly affecting the real power of his country. Similarly, the apprehensions of the English after P'heerooshuhur may be said to have had a personal as much as a national reference, and there is no good reason for believing that one or two or even three defeats on the Sutlej would have shaken the stability of the British rule to the east and south of Delhi. All the chiefs of India, indeed, are willing enough to be independent but no union for any such purpose yet exists among them, and only one or two are at any mioment ready to take up arms; whereas the resources of the English are vast, obedience among them is perfect, and victory would soon return to valour and unanimity. Still, an unsuccessful warfare on the part of the English of three or four consecutive years, might justly be regarded as the commencement of their decline; although it is very doubtful whether any combination of the present powers of India could drive them froi*' Bengal, or from the coasts of the Deccan.