Tempo:
— HISTORY OF THE SIKHS
26S
A
1845-6.
The
diffi-
and apprehencuities
*^®
En^Hsh^
CHAP. IX
battle had thus been won, and more than seventy pieces of artillery and some conquered or confiscated territories graced the success; but the victors had lost ^ seventh of their numbers, they were paralysed after their prodigious exertions and intense excitement, and 3rd Light Dragoons has been a theme of general admiration. loss sustained was 694 killed, and 1,721 wounded. [The casualties among the officers were very heavy 103 in all. Among them was the political officer. Major Broadfoot, who has figured so prominently in previous pages. Ed.] After the war. Lord Gough learnt that the loss of the Sikhs in killed probably amounted to 2,000 in all, as the heirs of 1,782 men of the regular troops alone claimed balances of pay due to relatives slain. This argues a great slaughter; and yet it was a common remark at the time, that very few dead bodies were to be seen on the field after the action. The statements of the Quarterly Review for June 1846, pp. 203-6, and of the Calcutta Review for Dec. 1847, p. 498, may^be referred to about certain points still but imperfectly known, and which it is only necessary to allude to in a general way in this history. Two of the points are: (1) the proposal to fall back on Ferozepore during the night of the 21st December; and (2) the actual movement of a considerable portion of tho British army towards that place on the forenoon of the follow-
The
—
ing day.
Had the Sikhs been efficiently commanded, a retirement on Ferozepore would have been judicious in a military point of view, but as the enemy was led by traitors, it was best to fearlessly keep the field. Perhaps neither the incapacity nor the treason of Lai Singh and Tej Singh were fully perceived or credited by the English chiefs, and hence the anxiety of the one on whom the maintenance of the British dominion intact mainly depended. At P'heerooshuhur the larger calibre and greater weight of metal of the mass of the Sikh artillery, and consequently the superiority of practice relatively to that of the field guns of the English, was markedly apparent in the condition of the two parks after the battle. The captured cannon showed scarcely any marks of round shot or shells, while nearly a third of the British guns were disabled in their carriages or tumbrils. With regard to this battle it may be observed that the English had not that exact knowledge of the Sikh strength and position which might have been obtained even by means of reconnoitring; and it may also perhaps be said that the attack should have been made in column rather than in line, and after the long flanks of the enemy's position had been enfiladed by artillery. The extent, indeed, to which the English were unprepared for a campaign, and the manner in which their forces were commanded in most of the actions of the war, should be carefully borne in mind; for it was defective tactics and the abolute want of ammuiiition, as much as the native valour and aptitude of the Sikhs, which gave for a time a character of equality to the struggle, and which in this history seems to make a comparatively petty power dispute with the English supremacy in Northern India. Had the English been better led and better equipped, the fame of the Sikhs would not have been so great as it is, and the British chronicler would have been spared the ungracious task of declaring unpleasing truths.
26S
A
1845-6.
The
diffi-
and apprehencuities
*^®
En^Hsh^
CHAP. IX
battle had thus been won, and more than seventy pieces of artillery and some conquered or confiscated territories graced the success; but the victors had lost ^ seventh of their numbers, they were paralysed after their prodigious exertions and intense excitement, and 3rd Light Dragoons has been a theme of general admiration. loss sustained was 694 killed, and 1,721 wounded. [The casualties among the officers were very heavy 103 in all. Among them was the political officer. Major Broadfoot, who has figured so prominently in previous pages. Ed.] After the war. Lord Gough learnt that the loss of the Sikhs in killed probably amounted to 2,000 in all, as the heirs of 1,782 men of the regular troops alone claimed balances of pay due to relatives slain. This argues a great slaughter; and yet it was a common remark at the time, that very few dead bodies were to be seen on the field after the action. The statements of the Quarterly Review for June 1846, pp. 203-6, and of the Calcutta Review for Dec. 1847, p. 498, may^be referred to about certain points still but imperfectly known, and which it is only necessary to allude to in a general way in this history. Two of the points are: (1) the proposal to fall back on Ferozepore during the night of the 21st December; and (2) the actual movement of a considerable portion of tho British army towards that place on the forenoon of the follow-
The
—
ing day.
Had the Sikhs been efficiently commanded, a retirement on Ferozepore would have been judicious in a military point of view, but as the enemy was led by traitors, it was best to fearlessly keep the field. Perhaps neither the incapacity nor the treason of Lai Singh and Tej Singh were fully perceived or credited by the English chiefs, and hence the anxiety of the one on whom the maintenance of the British dominion intact mainly depended. At P'heerooshuhur the larger calibre and greater weight of metal of the mass of the Sikh artillery, and consequently the superiority of practice relatively to that of the field guns of the English, was markedly apparent in the condition of the two parks after the battle. The captured cannon showed scarcely any marks of round shot or shells, while nearly a third of the British guns were disabled in their carriages or tumbrils. With regard to this battle it may be observed that the English had not that exact knowledge of the Sikh strength and position which might have been obtained even by means of reconnoitring; and it may also perhaps be said that the attack should have been made in column rather than in line, and after the long flanks of the enemy's position had been enfiladed by artillery. The extent, indeed, to which the English were unprepared for a campaign, and the manner in which their forces were commanded in most of the actions of the war, should be carefully borne in mind; for it was defective tactics and the abolute want of ammuiiition, as much as the native valour and aptitude of the Sikhs, which gave for a time a character of equality to the struggle, and which in this history seems to make a comparatively petty power dispute with the English supremacy in Northern India. Had the English been better led and better equipped, the fame of the Sikhs would not have been so great as it is, and the British chronicler would have been spared the ungracious task of declaring unpleasing truths.
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