Tempo:
CHAP. IX
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH
2&3
The Sikh leaders threatened Ferozepore, but no 1845-6. was made upon its seven thousand defenders, Ferozepore which with a proper spirit were led out by their com- threatened, mander, Sir John Littler, and showed a bold front to ^"t p^the overwhelming force of the enemy. The object, P°^^^y "°* ^"^^^*^indeed, of Lai Singh and Tej Singh was not to comproattack
mise themselves with the English by destroying an ^*^"^^"^*^ isolated division, but to get their own troops dispersed and^Tej'"^ by the converging forces of their opponents. Their singh. desire was to be upheld as the ministers of a dependent kingdom by grateful conquerors, and they thus deprecated an attack on Ferozepore, and assured the local British authorities of their secret and efficient goodwill. But these men had also to keep up an appearance of devotion to the interests of their country, and they urged the necessity of leaving the eas}^ prey of a can- ^he tactics tonment untouched, until the leaders of the English of the sikhs. should be attacked, and the fame of the Khalsa exalted by the captivity or death of a Governor-General.^ The Sikh army itself understood the necessity of unity of counsel in the affairs of war, and the power of the regimental and other committees was temporarily suspended by an agreement with the executive heads of the state, which enabled these unworthy men to effect their base objects with comparative ease.- Nevertheless, in the ordinary militarj'' arrangements of occupying positions and distributing infantry and cavalry, the generals and inferior commanders acted for them^
It
was sufficiently certain and notorious at the tinje that
Singh was in communication with Capt. Nicolson, the British Agent at Ferozepore, but, owing to the untimely death of that officer, the details of the overtures made, and expec(Cf. Dr. tations held out, cannot now be satisfactorily known. Macgregor's History of the Sikhs, ii. 80.) The Calcutta Review for June 1849 (p. 549), while doubting the fact, or at least the extent and importance, of Lai Singh's and Tej Singh's treachery, admits that the former was not only in communication with Capt. Nicolson, as stated, but that on the 7th Feb. 1846 he was understood to have sent a plan of the Sikh position at Sobraon to Col. Lawrence, and that on the 19th Dec. 1845, the day after the battle of Mudki, Lai Singh's agent came to Major Broadfoot, and was dismissed with a rebuke. [As regards Tej Singh's treachery it may be stated that, according to a reliable tradition, that officer discovered early in the operations that his artillery ammunition had been tampered with and much of it rendered useless. Such treachery on the part of his own side doubtless had considerable effect upon his subsequent conduct.- -Ed.] - Lai Singh was appointed wazir, and Tej Singh commander-in-chief of the army on or about the 8th Nov. 1845, according to the Lahore News-Letter of that date, prepared for Lai
Government.
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH
2&3
The Sikh leaders threatened Ferozepore, but no 1845-6. was made upon its seven thousand defenders, Ferozepore which with a proper spirit were led out by their com- threatened, mander, Sir John Littler, and showed a bold front to ^"t p^the overwhelming force of the enemy. The object, P°^^^y "°* ^"^^^*^indeed, of Lai Singh and Tej Singh was not to comproattack
mise themselves with the English by destroying an ^*^"^^"^*^ isolated division, but to get their own troops dispersed and^Tej'"^ by the converging forces of their opponents. Their singh. desire was to be upheld as the ministers of a dependent kingdom by grateful conquerors, and they thus deprecated an attack on Ferozepore, and assured the local British authorities of their secret and efficient goodwill. But these men had also to keep up an appearance of devotion to the interests of their country, and they urged the necessity of leaving the eas}^ prey of a can- ^he tactics tonment untouched, until the leaders of the English of the sikhs. should be attacked, and the fame of the Khalsa exalted by the captivity or death of a Governor-General.^ The Sikh army itself understood the necessity of unity of counsel in the affairs of war, and the power of the regimental and other committees was temporarily suspended by an agreement with the executive heads of the state, which enabled these unworthy men to effect their base objects with comparative ease.- Nevertheless, in the ordinary militarj'' arrangements of occupying positions and distributing infantry and cavalry, the generals and inferior commanders acted for them^
It
was sufficiently certain and notorious at the tinje that
Singh was in communication with Capt. Nicolson, the British Agent at Ferozepore, but, owing to the untimely death of that officer, the details of the overtures made, and expec(Cf. Dr. tations held out, cannot now be satisfactorily known. Macgregor's History of the Sikhs, ii. 80.) The Calcutta Review for June 1849 (p. 549), while doubting the fact, or at least the extent and importance, of Lai Singh's and Tej Singh's treachery, admits that the former was not only in communication with Capt. Nicolson, as stated, but that on the 7th Feb. 1846 he was understood to have sent a plan of the Sikh position at Sobraon to Col. Lawrence, and that on the 19th Dec. 1845, the day after the battle of Mudki, Lai Singh's agent came to Major Broadfoot, and was dismissed with a rebuke. [As regards Tej Singh's treachery it may be stated that, according to a reliable tradition, that officer discovered early in the operations that his artillery ammunition had been tampered with and much of it rendered useless. Such treachery on the part of his own side doubtless had considerable effect upon his subsequent conduct.- -Ed.] - Lai Singh was appointed wazir, and Tej Singh commander-in-chief of the army on or about the 8th Nov. 1845, according to the Lahore News-Letter of that date, prepared for Lai
Government.
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