Tempo:
WAR WITH THE ENGLISH
CHAP. IX
261
ministry, or even that the army, would have the courage to cross the river in force, and to court an equal contest; the known treasonable views of the chiefs, and the unity and depth of feeling which possessed the troops, were not fully appreciated, and it continued to be believed that a desultory warfare would sooner or later ensue, which would indeed require the British to interfere, but which would still enable them to do so at their own convenience. Thus boats for bridges, and regiments and guns, the natural and undesigned provocatives to a war, were sufficiently numerous; but food and ammunition, and carriage and hospital stores, such as were necessary for a campaign, were all behind at Delhi or Agra, or still remained to be collected; for the desire of the English was, it is said, peace, and they had hoped that an assemblage of troops would prevent predatory aggression, or deter the Sikhs from engaging in suicidal hostilities.^
vaded within a definite pei'iod; whereas, with regard to what the Sikh army might eventually do, Capt. Nicolson was as uncertain as others, up to within a week or so of the passage The truth seems to be, that of the Sutlej in December 1845. Major Broadfoot affected to disbeheve Capt. Nicolson's report of the actual march and near approach of the Lahore army, of its encampment on the Sutlej, and of its evident resolution to cross the river, giving the preference to intelligence of a contrary nature received direct from the Sikh capital, and which tallied with his own views of what the Sikhs would finally do. That such was the case, may indeed be gathered from the Governor-General's dispatch to the Secret Committee of (Parliamentary Papers, 1846, pp. 26, 27.) the 31st Dec. 1845. The writer of the article in the Calcutta Review, No. XVI, endeavours to justify Major Broadfoot's views by showing that The point all the officers on the frontier held similar opinions. really at issue, however, is not whether, generally "-peaking, invasion were probable, but whether in the beginning of December 1845 Major Broadfoot should not have held that the Sutlej would be crossed. The Reviewer forgets to add that of the local officers Major Broadfoot alone knew at the time the extenL of provocation which the Sikhs had received; and that the officers wrote with no later news before them than that Hence all, save Major Broadfoot of the 17th of November. himself had very imperfect means of forming a judgement of what was likely to take place. With regard to what the English have been prepared
should
against,
Lieut. -Col.
Richmond's
letter of the 3i-d April 1844, to the address of the Commanderin-Chief, be referred to as in favour of having stations strong if they were to be kept up at all.
may
1
It
was a common and a just remark at the time, that
although the Indian Government was fortunate in having a practical and approved soldier like Lord Hardinge at its head, under the circumstances of a war in progress, yet that had Lord Ellenborough remained Governor-General, the army would have taken the field better equipped than it did.
^845-6.
CHAP. IX
261
ministry, or even that the army, would have the courage to cross the river in force, and to court an equal contest; the known treasonable views of the chiefs, and the unity and depth of feeling which possessed the troops, were not fully appreciated, and it continued to be believed that a desultory warfare would sooner or later ensue, which would indeed require the British to interfere, but which would still enable them to do so at their own convenience. Thus boats for bridges, and regiments and guns, the natural and undesigned provocatives to a war, were sufficiently numerous; but food and ammunition, and carriage and hospital stores, such as were necessary for a campaign, were all behind at Delhi or Agra, or still remained to be collected; for the desire of the English was, it is said, peace, and they had hoped that an assemblage of troops would prevent predatory aggression, or deter the Sikhs from engaging in suicidal hostilities.^
vaded within a definite pei'iod; whereas, with regard to what the Sikh army might eventually do, Capt. Nicolson was as uncertain as others, up to within a week or so of the passage The truth seems to be, that of the Sutlej in December 1845. Major Broadfoot affected to disbeheve Capt. Nicolson's report of the actual march and near approach of the Lahore army, of its encampment on the Sutlej, and of its evident resolution to cross the river, giving the preference to intelligence of a contrary nature received direct from the Sikh capital, and which tallied with his own views of what the Sikhs would finally do. That such was the case, may indeed be gathered from the Governor-General's dispatch to the Secret Committee of (Parliamentary Papers, 1846, pp. 26, 27.) the 31st Dec. 1845. The writer of the article in the Calcutta Review, No. XVI, endeavours to justify Major Broadfoot's views by showing that The point all the officers on the frontier held similar opinions. really at issue, however, is not whether, generally "-peaking, invasion were probable, but whether in the beginning of December 1845 Major Broadfoot should not have held that the Sutlej would be crossed. The Reviewer forgets to add that of the local officers Major Broadfoot alone knew at the time the extenL of provocation which the Sikhs had received; and that the officers wrote with no later news before them than that Hence all, save Major Broadfoot of the 17th of November. himself had very imperfect means of forming a judgement of what was likely to take place. With regard to what the English have been prepared
should
against,
Lieut. -Col.
Richmond's
letter of the 3i-d April 1844, to the address of the Commanderin-Chief, be referred to as in favour of having stations strong if they were to be kept up at all.
may
1
It
was a common and a just remark at the time, that
although the Indian Government was fortunate in having a practical and approved soldier like Lord Hardinge at its head, under the circumstances of a war in progress, yet that had Lord Ellenborough remained Governor-General, the army would have taken the field better equipped than it did.
^845-6.
©
2026
Lehal.net