Tempo:
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HISTORY OF THE SIKHS
260 1845-6.
CHAP. IX
policy, and, in truth, tended to bring about that collision which it was so much desired to avoid.
A
corresponding singleness of apprehension also led the confident English to persevere in despising or misunderstanding the spirit of the disciples of Gobind. The unity and depth of feeling, derived from a young and fervid faith, were hardly recognized, and no historical associations exalted the Sikhs to the dignity of
Rajputs and Pathans. In 1842 they were held, as has been mentioned, to be unequal to cope with the Afghans, and even to be inferior in martial qualities to the population of the
Jammu hiils. In 1845 the Lahore soldiery was called a
The English
unprepared for a
campaign.
'rabble' in sober official dispatches, and although suosequent descriptions allowed the regiments to be composed' of the yeomanry of the country, the army was still d*eclared to be daily deteriorating as a military It is, indeed, certain that English officers and body.^ Indian sepoys equally believed they were about to win battles by marching steadily and by the discharge of a few artillery shots, rather than by skilful dispositions hard fighting, and a prolonged contest. The English not only undervalued their enemy, but, as has been hinted, they likewise mistook the form which the long-expected aggressions of the Sikhs would assume.'' It was scarcely thought that the 1
1845.
Major Broadfoot
to
Government,
18th
and
25th
Jan.
A year before, Lieut.-Col. Lawrence (Calcutta Review,
No. Ill, pp. 176, 177) considered the Sikh army as good as that of any other Indian power, and not inferior, indeed, to the The Lahore Gwalior tro'ops which fought at Maharajpur. artillery, however, he held to be very bad, although he was of In opinion that in position the guns would be well served. his Adventiirer in the Punjab (p. 47, note k) he had previously given a decided preference to the Maratha artillerv. 2 Major Smyth is, however, of opinion that the sepoys in the British service had a high opinion of the Sikh troops, although the English themselves talked of them as boasters and cowards. (Major Smyth, Reigning Family of Lahore. Introduction, pp. xxiv and xxv.) Cf. Dr. Macgregor, History of the Sikhs,
ii.
89, 90.
the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 31st Dec. 1845 (Parliamentary Papers, 1846), and the Calcutta Ref-ew words may here be said on a view, No. XVL p. 475. subject which occasioned some discussion in India at the time, viz. Major Broadfoot's reputed persevering disbelief that the Sikhs would cross the Sutlej, although his assistant, Capt. Nicolson, stationed at Ferozepore, had repeatedly said the> The matter was taKen up by the Indian public as would. if Capt. Nicolson had for several months, or for a year and more, held that the British provinces would assuredly be in3 Cf.
A
HISTORY OF THE SIKHS
260 1845-6.
CHAP. IX
policy, and, in truth, tended to bring about that collision which it was so much desired to avoid.
A
corresponding singleness of apprehension also led the confident English to persevere in despising or misunderstanding the spirit of the disciples of Gobind. The unity and depth of feeling, derived from a young and fervid faith, were hardly recognized, and no historical associations exalted the Sikhs to the dignity of
Rajputs and Pathans. In 1842 they were held, as has been mentioned, to be unequal to cope with the Afghans, and even to be inferior in martial qualities to the population of the
Jammu hiils. In 1845 the Lahore soldiery was called a
The English
unprepared for a
campaign.
'rabble' in sober official dispatches, and although suosequent descriptions allowed the regiments to be composed' of the yeomanry of the country, the army was still d*eclared to be daily deteriorating as a military It is, indeed, certain that English officers and body.^ Indian sepoys equally believed they were about to win battles by marching steadily and by the discharge of a few artillery shots, rather than by skilful dispositions hard fighting, and a prolonged contest. The English not only undervalued their enemy, but, as has been hinted, they likewise mistook the form which the long-expected aggressions of the Sikhs would assume.'' It was scarcely thought that the 1
1845.
Major Broadfoot
to
Government,
18th
and
25th
Jan.
A year before, Lieut.-Col. Lawrence (Calcutta Review,
No. Ill, pp. 176, 177) considered the Sikh army as good as that of any other Indian power, and not inferior, indeed, to the The Lahore Gwalior tro'ops which fought at Maharajpur. artillery, however, he held to be very bad, although he was of In opinion that in position the guns would be well served. his Adventiirer in the Punjab (p. 47, note k) he had previously given a decided preference to the Maratha artillerv. 2 Major Smyth is, however, of opinion that the sepoys in the British service had a high opinion of the Sikh troops, although the English themselves talked of them as boasters and cowards. (Major Smyth, Reigning Family of Lahore. Introduction, pp. xxiv and xxv.) Cf. Dr. Macgregor, History of the Sikhs,
ii.
89, 90.
the Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 31st Dec. 1845 (Parliamentary Papers, 1846), and the Calcutta Ref-ew words may here be said on a view, No. XVL p. 475. subject which occasioned some discussion in India at the time, viz. Major Broadfoot's reputed persevering disbelief that the Sikhs would cross the Sutlej, although his assistant, Capt. Nicolson, stationed at Ferozepore, had repeatedly said the> The matter was taKen up by the Indian public as would. if Capt. Nicolson had for several months, or for a year and more, held that the British provinces would assuredly be in3 Cf.
A
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