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JALALABAD
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THE SIKHS
227
Muhammad was about to be released under the pledge J842^ of a safe passage through the Punjab dominions; and it may have been thought prudent to conciliate the father of Akbar Khan, so famous for his successes against the English, by the surrender of a possession was inconvenient to hold.^ The Governor-General had prudently resolved to The assemble an army at Ferozepore, as a reserve in case covernorGeneral of further disasters in Afghanistan, and to make known
it
to the princes of India that their English masters had ^^^ the ready means of beating any who might rebel.^ minister Lord Ellenborough was also desirous of an interview and heirwith Sher Singh, and as gratitude was uppermost for apparent at ^^^^pore, the time, and added a grace even to success, it was proposed to thank the Maharaja in person for the proofs which he had afforded of his continued friendship. To invest the scene with greater eclat, it was further determined, in the spirit of the moment, to give expression to British sincerity and moderation at 1 The Sikhs were not unwilling to acquire territory, but they wished to see their way clearly, and they were unable to do so until the English had determined on their own line The Sikhs knew, indeed, of the resolution of the of policy. Governor-General to sever all connexion with Afghanistan, but they also knew the sentiments of the majority of Englishmen about at least temporarily retaining it. They saw, moreover, that recruited armies were still in possession of every
stronghold, and the policy was new to them of voluntarily relinThey therefore paused, and the subsequent release of Dost Muhammad again fettered them when the retirement of the troops seemed to leave them free to act, for they were bound to escort the Amir safely across the Punjab, and could not therefore make terms with him. The
quishing dominion.
Sikhs would have worked through Sultan Muhammad Khan and other chiefs until they were in a condition to use the frequent plea of the English, of being able to govern better than dependants. (Cf. Mr. Clerk to Government, 2nd Sept. 1842.) - Lord Auckland had likewise thought that such a demonstration might be advisable. (Government to Mr. Clerk, 3rd Dec. 1841.) Of measures practically identified with Lord Ellenborough's administration. Lord Auckland may further claim the merit of giving the generals commanding in Afghanistan supreme authority (Resolution of Government, 6th Jan. 1842), and of directing Sir William Nott to act without reference to previous instructions, and as he might deem b«^st for the safety of his troops and the honour of the British name. (Government to Sir William Nott, 10th Feb. 1842.) To Lord Auckland, however, is due the doubtful praise of suggesting the release of Dost Muhammad (Government to Mr. Clerk, 24th Feb. 1842); and he must certainly bear a share of the blame attached to the exaggerated estimate formed of the dangers which threatened the English after the retreat from Kabul, and to the timorous rather than prudent design of falling back on the Indus, or even on the Sutlej.
JALALABAD
:
THE SIKHS
227
Muhammad was about to be released under the pledge J842^ of a safe passage through the Punjab dominions; and it may have been thought prudent to conciliate the father of Akbar Khan, so famous for his successes against the English, by the surrender of a possession was inconvenient to hold.^ The Governor-General had prudently resolved to The assemble an army at Ferozepore, as a reserve in case covernorGeneral of further disasters in Afghanistan, and to make known
it
to the princes of India that their English masters had ^^^ the ready means of beating any who might rebel.^ minister Lord Ellenborough was also desirous of an interview and heirwith Sher Singh, and as gratitude was uppermost for apparent at ^^^^pore, the time, and added a grace even to success, it was proposed to thank the Maharaja in person for the proofs which he had afforded of his continued friendship. To invest the scene with greater eclat, it was further determined, in the spirit of the moment, to give expression to British sincerity and moderation at 1 The Sikhs were not unwilling to acquire territory, but they wished to see their way clearly, and they were unable to do so until the English had determined on their own line The Sikhs knew, indeed, of the resolution of the of policy. Governor-General to sever all connexion with Afghanistan, but they also knew the sentiments of the majority of Englishmen about at least temporarily retaining it. They saw, moreover, that recruited armies were still in possession of every
stronghold, and the policy was new to them of voluntarily relinThey therefore paused, and the subsequent release of Dost Muhammad again fettered them when the retirement of the troops seemed to leave them free to act, for they were bound to escort the Amir safely across the Punjab, and could not therefore make terms with him. The
quishing dominion.
Sikhs would have worked through Sultan Muhammad Khan and other chiefs until they were in a condition to use the frequent plea of the English, of being able to govern better than dependants. (Cf. Mr. Clerk to Government, 2nd Sept. 1842.) - Lord Auckland had likewise thought that such a demonstration might be advisable. (Government to Mr. Clerk, 3rd Dec. 1841.) Of measures practically identified with Lord Ellenborough's administration. Lord Auckland may further claim the merit of giving the generals commanding in Afghanistan supreme authority (Resolution of Government, 6th Jan. 1842), and of directing Sir William Nott to act without reference to previous instructions, and as he might deem b«^st for the safety of his troops and the honour of the British name. (Government to Sir William Nott, 10th Feb. 1842.) To Lord Auckland, however, is due the doubtful praise of suggesting the release of Dost Muhammad (Government to Mr. Clerk, 24th Feb. 1842); and he must certainly bear a share of the blame attached to the exaggerated estimate formed of the dangers which threatened the English after the retreat from Kabul, and to the timorous rather than prudent design of falling back on the Indus, or even on the Sutlej.
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