Tempo:
CHAP. VIII
DISTRUST OF THE SIKHS
223
it was asked and used only served to sink the Lahore i84i. army lower than before in British estimation.^ Four regiments of sepoys marched from Feroze- The
pore without guns, and unsupported by cavalry, to English vainly endeavour to force the Pass of Khaibar; and the distrustful Sikh troops at Peshawar were urged by the local Bri- eVu^ Sikhs, but. ... J1-Itish authorities their praiseworthy ardour, rather y^ urged than deliberately ordered by their own government at upon them
m
i,
•
..1
the instance of its ally, to co-operate in the attempt, or ^o^ aid. indeed to march alone to Jalalabad. The fact that the English had been beaten was notorious, and the belief in their alarm was welcome the Sikh governor was obliged, in the absence of orders, to take the sense ot the regimental 'punches' or committees; and the hasty requisition to march was rejected, through fear alone, as the English said, but really with feelings in which contempt, distrust, and apprehension were all mixed. The district Governor-General, Avitabile, who fortunately still retained his province, freely gave what aid he could; some pieces of artillery were furnished as well as abundance of ordinary supplies, and the British detachment effected the relief of Ali Musjid. But the unpardonable neglect of going to the fort without the food which had been provided, obliged the garrison to retreat after a few days, and the disinclination of the Sikhs to fight the battles of strangers communicated itself to the mercenary soldiers of the English, and thus added to the Governor-General's dislike of the Afghan connexion.:
Mr. Colvin, in the minute referred to in the preceding grounds his proposition for withdrawing to the Sutlej partly on Mr. Clerk's low estimate of the Sikhs, and their presumed inability to resist the Afghans. Col. Wade seems to hav^e had a somewhat similar opinion of the comparative prowess of the two races, on the fair presumption that the note (p. 535) of Munshi Shahamat All's Sikhs and Afghans is his. He says the Sikhs always dreaded the Khaibaris; and, indeed, General Avitabile could also take up the notion with some reason, in one sense, as the magistrate of a district surrounded by marauding highlanders, and with sufficient adroitness in another when he did not desire to see Sikh regiments hurried into mountain defiles at the instance of the English authorities. (Cf. the Calcutta Review, No. Ill, p. 182.) '
note,
The statements in this paragraph are mainly taken from official and demi-official correspondence. The letter of Government to Mr. Clerk, of the 7th Feb. 1842, -
the author's notes of
may also be referred to about the failure to hold Ali Musjid: and, further, it may be mentioned that Mr. Clerk, in his letter of the 10th February, pointed out, that although the Sikhs might not willingly co-operate in any sudden assault planned by the English, they would be found ready to give assistance
DISTRUST OF THE SIKHS
223
it was asked and used only served to sink the Lahore i84i. army lower than before in British estimation.^ Four regiments of sepoys marched from Feroze- The
pore without guns, and unsupported by cavalry, to English vainly endeavour to force the Pass of Khaibar; and the distrustful Sikh troops at Peshawar were urged by the local Bri- eVu^ Sikhs, but. ... J1-Itish authorities their praiseworthy ardour, rather y^ urged than deliberately ordered by their own government at upon them
m
i,
•
..1
the instance of its ally, to co-operate in the attempt, or ^o^ aid. indeed to march alone to Jalalabad. The fact that the English had been beaten was notorious, and the belief in their alarm was welcome the Sikh governor was obliged, in the absence of orders, to take the sense ot the regimental 'punches' or committees; and the hasty requisition to march was rejected, through fear alone, as the English said, but really with feelings in which contempt, distrust, and apprehension were all mixed. The district Governor-General, Avitabile, who fortunately still retained his province, freely gave what aid he could; some pieces of artillery were furnished as well as abundance of ordinary supplies, and the British detachment effected the relief of Ali Musjid. But the unpardonable neglect of going to the fort without the food which had been provided, obliged the garrison to retreat after a few days, and the disinclination of the Sikhs to fight the battles of strangers communicated itself to the mercenary soldiers of the English, and thus added to the Governor-General's dislike of the Afghan connexion.:
Mr. Colvin, in the minute referred to in the preceding grounds his proposition for withdrawing to the Sutlej partly on Mr. Clerk's low estimate of the Sikhs, and their presumed inability to resist the Afghans. Col. Wade seems to hav^e had a somewhat similar opinion of the comparative prowess of the two races, on the fair presumption that the note (p. 535) of Munshi Shahamat All's Sikhs and Afghans is his. He says the Sikhs always dreaded the Khaibaris; and, indeed, General Avitabile could also take up the notion with some reason, in one sense, as the magistrate of a district surrounded by marauding highlanders, and with sufficient adroitness in another when he did not desire to see Sikh regiments hurried into mountain defiles at the instance of the English authorities. (Cf. the Calcutta Review, No. Ill, p. 182.) '
note,
The statements in this paragraph are mainly taken from official and demi-official correspondence. The letter of Government to Mr. Clerk, of the 7th Feb. 1842, -
the author's notes of
may also be referred to about the failure to hold Ali Musjid: and, further, it may be mentioned that Mr. Clerk, in his letter of the 10th February, pointed out, that although the Sikhs might not willingly co-operate in any sudden assault planned by the English, they would be found ready to give assistance
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