Tempo:
CHAP. VII
ENGLISH POLICY ERRONEOUS
197
and of the fact that his friendship was courted, to try is^t-b. and secure himself against the only power he really feared, viz. that of the Sikhs; and he renewed his over°ost mu. tures to Persia and welcomed a Russian emissary, witn surrender into the the view of intimidating the English ^^^'JJfa^iy of Peshawar, and into a guarantee against Ranjit^ingh. ^^^^^ ^^10 Friendly assurances to the .Kandahar brothers, and a the views of hint that the Sikhs were at liberty to march on Kabul, Persia and would have given Dost Muhammad a proper sense of Russia, his insignificance; ^ but the truth and the importance The origipolicy of his hostile designs were both believed or assumed ^^ of rumours a while the Government, British by the ^^g^gj^ northern invasion were eagerly received and industri- erroneous, ously spread by the vanquished princes of India, and the whole country vibrated with the hope that the uncongenial domination of the English was about to yield to the ascendancy of another and less dissimilar The recall of Capt. Burnes from Kabul gave But, under race.circumspeciousness to the wildest statements; the advantage the of striking some great blow became more and more brought obvious; for the sake of consistency it was necessary about, the maintain peace on the Indus, and it was wisely expedition resolved to make a triumphant progress through Cen- to Kabul tral Asia, and to leave Shah Shuja as a dependent ^^^fZ f.!!!* boldly conprince on his ancestral throne. The conception was ceived. bold and perfect; and had it been steadily adhered to, the whole project would have eminently answered the ends intended, and would have been, in every way, worthy of the English name.-^ to
In the beginning of 1838 the Governor-General did fegotiations rC" not contemplate the restoration of Shah Shuja; * but in garbing the himself thought it would be but justice to restore the district to Sultan Muhammad Khan, while Munshi Mohan Lai (Life of Dost Muhammad, i. 257, &c.) represents the Amir to have thought that the surrender of Peshawar to his brother would have been more prejudicial to his interests than its retention by the Sikhs. 1 Such were Capt. Wade's views, and they are sketched in his letters of the 15th May and 28th Oct. 1837, with reference to commercial objects, although the line of policy may not have been steadily adhered to, or fully developed. - The extent to which this feeling was prevalent is known to those who were observers of Indian affairs at the time, and it is dwelt upon in the Governor-General's minute of the 20th Aug. 1839.
"The Governor-General's minute of 12th May 1838, and his declaration of the 1st October of the same year, may be referred to as summing up the views which moved the British Government on the occasion. Both were published by order of Parliament in March 1839. * Government to Capt. Wade, 20th Jan. 1838.
ENGLISH POLICY ERRONEOUS
197
and of the fact that his friendship was courted, to try is^t-b. and secure himself against the only power he really feared, viz. that of the Sikhs; and he renewed his over°ost mu. tures to Persia and welcomed a Russian emissary, witn surrender into the the view of intimidating the English ^^^'JJfa^iy of Peshawar, and into a guarantee against Ranjit^ingh. ^^^^^ ^^10 Friendly assurances to the .Kandahar brothers, and a the views of hint that the Sikhs were at liberty to march on Kabul, Persia and would have given Dost Muhammad a proper sense of Russia, his insignificance; ^ but the truth and the importance The origipolicy of his hostile designs were both believed or assumed ^^ of rumours a while the Government, British by the ^^g^gj^ northern invasion were eagerly received and industri- erroneous, ously spread by the vanquished princes of India, and the whole country vibrated with the hope that the uncongenial domination of the English was about to yield to the ascendancy of another and less dissimilar The recall of Capt. Burnes from Kabul gave But, under race.circumspeciousness to the wildest statements; the advantage the of striking some great blow became more and more brought obvious; for the sake of consistency it was necessary about, the maintain peace on the Indus, and it was wisely expedition resolved to make a triumphant progress through Cen- to Kabul tral Asia, and to leave Shah Shuja as a dependent ^^^fZ f.!!!* boldly conprince on his ancestral throne. The conception was ceived. bold and perfect; and had it been steadily adhered to, the whole project would have eminently answered the ends intended, and would have been, in every way, worthy of the English name.-^ to
In the beginning of 1838 the Governor-General did fegotiations rC" not contemplate the restoration of Shah Shuja; * but in garbing the himself thought it would be but justice to restore the district to Sultan Muhammad Khan, while Munshi Mohan Lai (Life of Dost Muhammad, i. 257, &c.) represents the Amir to have thought that the surrender of Peshawar to his brother would have been more prejudicial to his interests than its retention by the Sikhs. 1 Such were Capt. Wade's views, and they are sketched in his letters of the 15th May and 28th Oct. 1837, with reference to commercial objects, although the line of policy may not have been steadily adhered to, or fully developed. - The extent to which this feeling was prevalent is known to those who were observers of Indian affairs at the time, and it is dwelt upon in the Governor-General's minute of the 20th Aug. 1839.
"The Governor-General's minute of 12th May 1838, and his declaration of the 1st October of the same year, may be referred to as summing up the views which moved the British Government on the occasion. Both were published by order of Parliament in March 1839. * Government to Capt. Wade, 20th Jan. 1838.
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